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Dec 06, 2023

Lessons Learned and Reinforced at a Florida Flea Market Fire

What We Learned | By Michael Eng On July 7, 2022, Miami-Dade (FL) Fire-Rescue

What We Learned | By Michael Eng

On July 7, 2022, Miami-Dade (FL) Fire-Rescue (MDFR) responded to a reported fire at an outdoor flea market with one burn victim. On arrival, firefighting crews encountered multiple booths on fire, with flames spreading rapidly because of high winds. Firefighters faced challenges such as distant hydrants; maze-like configurations over an expansive area; and a large, adjacent, exposed warehouse required a second and, eventually, a third alarm.

Engine 2 was the first-arriving company. The officer established incident command with a report of, "Heavy smoke and multiple flea market stalls on fire." Witnesses advised firefighters that the fire started in a food truck, resulting in one male civilian with a burn injury. On arrival of Battalion 5, command was transferred after a face-to-face briefing from Engine 2's company officer.

The next-arriving company, Engine 7, established a water supply and supplied fire attack to Engine 2. Companies laying large-diameter supply hoselines on narrow roadways, such as trailer parks and apartment complexes, should pull hose to the side to allow for the passage of apparatus before it is charged. When hydrants are distant from a fire scene, engine companies should team up to combine the length of their hosebeds and pump supply lines while connected directly to hydrants to maximize available water and overcome friction loss in long hoselays. Extremely long hoselays may require engine companies to operate an inline relay pumping operation.

The close proximity of the booths; an extremely heavy fire load; strong winds; and multiple combustibles comprising various tools, machinery, vehicle parts, clothing, food trucks, and furnishings contributed to rapid fire spread. Visibility at the ground level was nearly zero, and there was a toxic mixture of black smoke in the air. In this situation, apparatus drivers must take extra precautions not to hit civilians and first responders on the road. Additionally, pump operators should be prepared to don self-contained breathing apparatus, even if working remotely from the actual fire.

(1) The property sat on approximately 3.72 acres of industrial land consisting of multiple outdoor booths. These booths are joined together and share either a common metal deck or tarp covering. A commercial warehouse structure sits on the property immediately adjacent to the outdoor booths, occupied by approximately 200 booths selling tools, auto parts, furniture, clothing, and pets. (Photos by author.)

(2) The site days before the fire, revealing the heavy fire load and close proximity of the booths. Several outdoor cooking areas and food trucks were also scattered throughout the property.

Engine 35 was directed to provide fire attack from the west side, while the first-arriving Medic unit—Rescue 35—tended to a burned civilian; the man was transported to a nearby trauma center because of his injuries. Engine 35 was then directed to attack the fire from the west side.

Strong, consistent winds from the east pushed the fire into the warehouse portion of the flea market. Radiant heat, impinging on the corrugated metal walls, conducted heat to indoor booths and heavily packed contents, resulting in deep-seated fires that were difficult to extinguish with handlines and master streams.

MDFR operates several short-wheelbase aerial apparatus. Some are technically quints because of their complement of ground ladders. However, Aerial 19 (photo 9) is basically an engine equipped with an aerial ladder. This type of apparatus is ideally suited for a fire like this because of its maneuverability and ability to establish its own five-inch supply line, laid from hydrant to the fire. To maximize hydrant flows, MDFR uses four-way hydrant valves that allow a subsequent-arriving engine to connect to the hydrant and pressurize the supply line without interrupting the flow of water; a second aerial apparatus, Ladder 26, was deployed to the north side of this building for the same purpose. Their hydrant water supply was established by Engine 30, arriving on the second alarm.

(3, 4) Engine 7 behind Engine 2. Note the flow controlled by a "portable hydrant" water thief manifold.

Congested conditions on the fireground did not allow engine apparatus to maneuver into positions where they could operate their apparatus-mounted deck guns. Companies were effective, however, in deploying portable master stream devices supplied by a single 2½- or three-inch hoseline. Although their maximum flow, no greater than 500 gallons per minute, is roughly half of the flow of an apparatus deck gun, they have the advantage of mobility. Here, companies directed their streams into warehouse bay overhead door openings. When directing master streams into a building, be mindful that a gallon of water weighs 8.34 pounds, so the combined flow of two or more portable master stream devices can add tons of water per minute, adding significant weight to contents. Products such as paper and fabric may absorb water and swell, potentially pushing exterior walls away from roof connections.

Because of the increasing number of personnel operating in a specific area, Engine 2's officer was assigned as the east division supervisor responsible for Engines 7 and 35. Once it became clear that fire had entered the warehouse, a warehouse division was also created. Battalion 8 assumed this supervisory role in charge of Aerial 19, Rescue 19, and Engine 40. This allowed for efficient management of opening up bay doors and ensuring all civilians had evacuated safely. Eventually, a north division was created and managed by Battalion 3.

A drone proved extremely helpful in providing continuous roof size-ups as well as determining the full scope of exposure threats. Drone thermal imaging also allowed for tracking the fire's progression and pinpointing hot spots, even through thick, dark smoke conditions. In the postcontrol phase, the drone was flown into the warehouse to assess its structural stability without committing crews inside.

The fire alarm office (FAO) typically announces incident benchmark times every 10 minutes for the first half-hour, then every 15 minutes thereafter until the incident is declared "under control." More than just giving a status report to the FAO, this serves as a reminder of how much time has passed and aids in keeping track of how long a structure or, more importantly, its structural components have been subject to fire. Remember, many fires burn long before they are noticed and reported. This also applies to large, open, high-roofline warehouses or fires in closed, energy-efficient structures that have become ventilation controlled/limited that result in "nothing showing" from the exterior.

(5) Engine 2's crew stretches a 1¾-inch hoseline to protect the large gas tanks on the food trucks with tank water.

During prolonged defensive fires, it is easy to lose track of just how long companies have been operating. Use this FAO benchmark as a prompt to conduct ongoing size-up to judge the effectiveness of strategy and tactics and the level of risk to personnel. Incident commanders must devise a "Plan B"—an alternate strategy and tactics to have resources ready for immediate deployment if "Plan A" isn't working. For example, if an offensive, interior attack with handlines is not successful or is no longer reasonably safe, companies must be ready with master streams and a collapse zone calculated.

Most flea market setups consist of retail booths within close proximity of each other, resulting in varied fire loads in a tight shared space. For this fire, although there was no exact percentage of which booths were damaged or destroyed, the ones closest to the warehouse (six or fewer booths per tent) were completely burned out, with some radiant heat damage to the adjacent row and none to all others. Rapid exposure protection from fire crews with strong winds blowing away from the booths helped. However, the warehouse was downwind, subjecting it to consistent, well-fed, oxygen-rich fire.

Because this was declared a defensive fire, no interior search operations were conducted. It is still important to gather information and accountability of all occupants who may have been in the structure or are unaccounted for. MDFR personnel encouraged employees to gather in a specific collection area. Warehouse managers were then recruited to assist in ensuring their employees were all present and accounted for. Once the fire was somewhat under control, a precautionary search of accessible areas was conducted. Crews located multiple cages of small pet birds and rabbits; although some succumbed to the smoke, many survived and were successfully removed.

Radio discipline on multialarm fires is critical and, in this instance, was largely adhered to. Radio transmissions must be concise, relevant, and appropriate, along with balancing the need for other units to communicate. The creation of divisions and groups aided in managing not just the span of control but communications as well. All personnel-assigned, designated supervisors should make every effort to conduct face-to-face transmissions to minimize air traffic.

Some unit officers were operating on "simplex" instead of "duplex" radio frequencies. This may seem minor, because of those in the immediate area still being able to hear transmissions, but it can be a serious flaw for two reasons. First, FAO dispatchers will not hear "simplex" transmissions because they are not strengthened by a repeater. There have been incidents when the dispatcher was the first person to read a Mayday or priority radio transmission; this is because of their sound-sterile environment, isolated headsets, and lack of distraction. Second, transmissions on simplex transmissions will not be captured in official audio recordings, which are vital for investigations and postincident analysis.

(6, 7) Engine 2 operating a 1¾-inch hoseline with tank water. Note the stretched 2½-inch hoseline. Once the water supply is established and the portable master stream device is connected to the nozzle, crews will transition to the 2½-inch hoselines.

(8) When visibility is limited, company officers and apparatus drivers must take extra precautions such as a having a member walk ahead of the apparatus as it is maneuvered into position.

(9) A short-wheelbase aerial apparatus is highly maneuverable and able to lay its own five-inch supply line.

The warehouse involved was of Type II noncombustible construction, comprised of corrugated metal wall panels and roof decking attached to a framework of lightweight metal "C" beams and columns. This structure is considered noncombustible in the sense that it will not contribute fuel to a fire but is prone to early collapse when its lightweight structural members are subjected to fire. In addition to a large 8,000-square-foot open space, the interior consisted of multiple compartmentalized areas.

The building had overhead sheet curtain doors that resembled overhead rolling doors but without interlocking slats. Curtain doors consist of sheet metal panels pressed together to form a continuous sheet that is strong yet flexible enough to roll up into an overhead drum. "Plan A" for forcing sheet curtain doors is the same as for overhead rolling doors—cut a vertical slice a few inches from the end of the door to reach the chain-hoist mechanism and raise the door. If the chain is on the other end of the door, cut another slice. This technique allows the door to be raised completely, providing maximum access and ventilation with minimal cutting. "Plan A," however, would not have been possible at that stage of the fire because the torsion springs in the overhead drum that counterbalances the weight of the door had lost their tension from heat. Firefighters appropriately performed "box cuts" on the door, consisting of one horizontal and two vertical cuts.

(10) When declaring a defensive or no-entry incident, it is important to reinforce this to operating crews who may be tempted to enter with exterior handlines. Firefighters on the nozzle may unknowingly take a few steps inside to gain slightly better access to difficult-to-reach hot spots or fire inside. Warehouse or storage structures may contain compromised stacked materials or high rack systems that present collapse hazards, even after the fire is under control. Heated steel/concrete can expand and contract, even hours after extinguishment, resulting in partial or complete collapse.

Had this fire occurred on a weekend, apparatus access would have been hampered by hundreds of fleeing customers. This is one of many reasons preincident planning is crucial for high-occupancy, multicombustible product retail areas. Along with formal inspections, it is important to conduct regular, informal "walk-throughs" because occupancies such as indoor and outdoor markets can change significantly in layout and fire load from week to week. Preplanning should also include strategic and tactical considerations for specific times of the day such as when the occupancy load is highest. In some cases, businesses/warehouses have just as many, if not more, employees operating during late/early morning hours.

Preincident planning is not just administrative "busy work." If done effectively, it can provide perhaps the only visual insight to a structure under zero visibility or difficult fire conditions. Determining major hazards, obstacles, likely occupant locations, and effective strategic/tactical options before a fire is essential to safe, effective incident mitigation. Hydrant locations, standpipe/suppression systems (or lack of), hazardous materials, structural and roof types, preestablished staging, rehab, apparatus entry/egress, and shelter-in-place vs. evacuation considerations are all factors you should consider.

(11, 12) Vertical ventilation is not recommended when lightweight trusses are potentially compromised by heat or fire. As an alternative, consider forcing open bay doors to not only assist in clearing out smoke but also for water applications from exterior hoselines, ground monitors, or master streams. Despite a defensive, no-entry declaration, openings should be made as wide as allowable for best stream reach, ongoing size-ups, and possible postincident access/investigation.

The staging area manager is one of the most important yet underrated positions on the fireground. This person must be disciplined and forceful on scene to not only maintain accountability but also limit freelancing. This individual must have the confidence and autonomy to continuously size up, anticipate, and suggest IC resource needs by forecasting. For example, if an increasing number of patients/victims are encountered as the scene progresses, more medical rescues may be needed. In addition to the resources themselves, the staging area manager must ensure that apparatus are parked in an orderly fashion to facilitate rapid deployment to the scene. For identification and safety, this manager should wear a designated command vest and limit pedestrian and vehicle movement to only essential crews in the area. An effective staging area manager constantly sizes up the area for unexpected changes such as downwind smoke shifts, newly blocked-off roads, or space constraints for newly arriving apparatus. Therefore, this person should also be flexible and be prepared to relocate/expand the staging area as needed. In the early stages of an incident, this position may be managed by an apparatus driver or tailboard firefighter. Eventually, this manager can be replaced with a more experienced officer or battalion chief.

Again, an effective manager must maintain an authoritative disciplined presence to ensure control of the area. The originally assigned individual can be tasked as a documentation or radio transmissions aide to the newly assigned manager. It is very important that, when additional companies are requested, the requestor specifies whether the company should report with their apparatus or just personnel. This is crucial in reducing apparatus unnecessarily entering an already congested area.

The formal designation and announcement of a staging area manager should be communicated by the IC or FAO to all incoming units, especially on multiple-alarm assignments. At this incident, companies responding on the second and third alarms were given the following instructions because of traffic congestion: "Attention, all units, due to inaccessible westbound traffic, enter the secured eastbound road for Level 2 staging on NW 37th Avenue."

Designating a planning section is important on a large-scale incident to support the IC in tracking operating and staged resources. This position assists with anticipating future needs such food and rehab units, fuel trucks, and heavy construction/demolition equipment.

Planning can also facilitate coordination with other agencies and develop strategic contingency plans, taking into account the possibility civilian evacuation and relocation and hostile weather such as lightning from strong thunderstorms.

At this incident, a public information officer (PIO) designated a media gathering area to disseminate consistent messaging of relevant community information such as traffic blockages, power loss, business reopening projections, and so on. Road closures and loss of utilities in the surrounding area significantly impacted business operations.

A PIO can temper frustrations of the community and business owners. For example, to the untrained eye, the inability to fully extinguish a fire quickly or viewing damaging overhaul efforts can be perceived as incompetence. Anger and frustration were to be expected, considering the damaged and destroyed retail booths were owned by proprietors who lost most or all of their livelihood.

Fire departments must consider the culture and customs of the communities they protect and plan accordingly. For example, large outdoor and indoor markets, similar to the one discussed in this article, are common in Caribbean and South and Central American countries. In multicultural Miami-Dade and other areas with a rapidly rising immigrant population, firefighters on medical calls are finding families residing in commercial occupancies, where they would not be expected. Additionally, residents residing in businesses, single-room occupancies, and garages commonly cook with a 20-pound propane cylinders right next to their stoves.

Operating in hot, humid weather conditions can exponentially cause rapid exhaustion in crews. Establishing a defined and staffed rehabilitation area is crucial during long-term incidents. Doing so maintains accountability by keeping crews together during recovery and while waiting for reassignment. Taking vital signs ensures health-related abnormalities such as low oxygen saturation levels, carbon monoxide exposure, and elevated heart rates are captured early.

Position the rehab area close to but safely far enough away from the scene, to keep crews out of downwind smoke/toxins and other hazards. Set it up away from vehicle traffic or idling apparatus. Also be sure to monitor carbon monoxide readings in the area, as dangerous levels can accumulate over time. A medical rescue should also be close by, ready to treat and transport personnel; if one is used, be sure to replenish it with another one immediately for possible additional patients.

When a large number of apparatus are committed, consider demobilization efforts as soon as is practical. Multiple alarms pull resources from other areas, requiring the relocation of companies. The designation of a demobilization unit leader can support the IC by developing an efficient plan for the orderly release of units.

Companies, such as engines, that have laid long supply lines and ladder apparatus connected to water supplies are going to be more difficult to release than apparatus that are not committed. Other factors in deciding who to release are those closer to exit points, fatigued crews, and units that are far from home coverage areas. Lastly, account for additional out-of-service time for decontamination procedures.

MICHAEL ENG is a 22-year fire service veteran and the operations division chief for Miami-Dade (FL) Fire-Rescue (MDFR). As a certified Level III fire instructor, his primary specialty is lecturing on incident command, fire tactics, and aircraft rescue firefighting for local universities and agencies. As the chairman of the MDFR Standard Operating Committee, he oversees an elite team in the formulation of incident strategic, tactical, and other significant department policies. Eng also serves as a department emergency management community response team instructor, an antiterrorism liaison officer, and a nationally certified hazardous materials technician.